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1. Introduction
The current crisis has greatly aﬀected countries around the globe.
In its World Economic Outlook of 2009, the International Monetary
Fund predicted that global output would decrease by 1.3 percent in
2009 and increase by only 1.9 percent in 2010 (IMF, 2009). But this
number hides individual country eﬀects: for example, the IMF report
projected a decline in output of close to 4 percent this year for Mex-
ico, and 1.5 percent for the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Moreover, the Millennium Development Goals are at risk of not being
achieved by their deadline of 2015. An interesting research question is
how much this decrease in national output aﬀects labor market out-
comes, like employment and wages, and what policy tools are available
in order to diminish the negative eﬀects of the crisis.
The topic is of great importance to policy makers. Some groups
of workers can be more aﬀected than others. In order for the policy
maker to apply speciﬁc policies in beneﬁt of those workers, the pol-
icy maker needs to know what type of workers are aﬀected and the
margin of the eﬀect (wages, employment, etc). Once the eﬀects are
known, a theoretical framework is needed in order to devise strate-
gies to counteract the eﬀect of the crisis like wage subsidies, training
programs, etc. In this paper, I address those two aspects for the case
of Mexico.
Mexico has suﬀered two previous crises in recent years. These
crises are diﬀerent in how they started, their length, and their depth.
The 1995 crisis caused a decline in GDP of 7 percent, although Mex-
ico’s recovery was relatively fast. By 1997, Mexico had the same real
GDP as before the crisis. However, the 2001 crisis only caused a small
decline in GDP, followed by stagnation and slow recovery until 2004.
The 2008 crisis has caused a decrease of 10% in GDP. This crisis was
caused by factors external to Mexico and not internal factors like the
1995 crisis. Even though the current crisis looks diﬀerent to the 1995
and 2001 crises, they share some elements that can be helpful for un-
derstanding the possible eﬀects of the current crisis on employment.
For example, the current crisis is similar to the 1995 crisis in its depth,
but it was caused by external factors like the 2001 crisis.
Researchers have been interested in the eﬀects of a macroeco-
nomic shock in terms of employment for a long time. McKenzie (2003)
analyzes the 1995 crisis in Mexico. He ﬁnds that labor force partici-
pation was reduced given the crisis, an aspect I verify using diﬀerent
data. Verick (2009) ﬁnds that the group most aﬀected by crises is
young workers. He argues that policy makers need to devise wage
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contrast to Verick (2009), I analyze the eﬀect of shocks on diﬀerent
groups of workers and also analyze theoretically the conditions under
which a wage subsidy would have a positive eﬀect on formal employ-
ment in the presence of an informal sector. Fallon and Lucas (2002)
analyze diﬀerent macroeconomic shocks for a sample of countries.
Their key ﬁnding is that equilibrium in the labor market is reached
through wages not employment. However, they use annual data and
if a crisis is short lived the negative consequences will not be seen.
Indeed, in my analysis below I do ﬁnd that employment is aﬀected
in the 1995 crisis but in the very short run. Hence, in order to fully
analyze the eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks, quarterly or monthly
data are needed.
The goals of the paper are to analyze how the previous crises
have aﬀected employment in Mexico and also to use current informa-
tion to compare the recent crisis with previous ones. I propose an
empirical strategy that relies on constructing an event study as de-
scribed in Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993). The event study
consists in ordering all crises with respect to a particular period. In
this way, we can compare the eﬀects of the three crises on the same
graph according to their length. The event study makes it possible to
calculate elasticities of the outcome variables with respect to changes
in GDP.
The empirical ﬁndings are in line with ﬁndings in other countries
(see for example Verick, 2009). Unskilled workers are more aﬀected
by macroeconomic shocks than highly skilled workers. Younger work-
ers are more aﬀected than workers in their prime or older workers.
After the occurrence of a macroeconomic shock, some workers decide
to leave the labor force (especially young workers), unemployment
increases for all type of workers, employment in the informal sector
expands relative to the formal sector, and relative wages of formal
sector workers in terms of informal workers increase (or at least it
does not decrease).
I also develop a model that aims to understand labor market
ﬂows and wage adjustments under crises periods. This model will
be helpful to understand what policy tools are available in order to
counteract the negative eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks to a particu-
lar group of workers. In particular, the model allows for the inclusion
of wage subsidies and (negative) proﬁt taxes as a way to stimulate
labor demand. These policy instruments will be eﬀective depending
on the magnitude of the elasticities of supply and demand. The re-
sults of the model imply that labor supply elasticities in the formal
and informal sector are close to 0.75 and zero respectively, and that180 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
labor demand elasticities in both sectors are close to one. Using these
results, a 5% reduction in payroll taxes will diminish approximately
50% the eﬀects of a negative shock of 10% in the economy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the
previous crises in Mexico. Section 3 explains the data to be used
in the current study. Section 4 explains the two empirical methods
to estimate the eﬀects of previous macroeconomic shocks on employ-
ment. Section 5 presents the results of the paper. Section 6 presents
the theoretical model to understand how the labor market adjusts.
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions of the study.
2. Macroeconomic Shocks
In order to measure the impact of the economic crisis on employment,
we need to deﬁne what we mean by “crisis”. In this note, “crisis” is
deﬁned as a fall in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
in two consecutive quarters. Another important statistical aspect is
that the GDP series used has been detrended.
In ﬁgure A1, we can observe the evolution of GDP and GDP per
capita in Mexico in the last 30 years. There have been six crises:
1981: IV, 1985: I, 1987: IV, 1995: I, 2000: IV, and 2008: III. Given
data limitation (labor force surveys are not available for the period
before 1987), the crises to be studied are 1995: I, 2000: IV and
whenever possible the current crisis 2008: III. In the graph, we can
see that those crises are diﬀerent in their length and depth. While the
crisis in 1995 lasted 11 quarters, the crisis in 2001 lasted 14 quarters.
Moreover, the crisis in 1995 was caused by domestic problems, and
the crisis in 2001 was caused by the decrease in economic activity
in the United States and the September 11th attacks. The crisis in
1995 was more traumatic in the sense that GDP per capita decreased
by close to 12 percent, while in 2001 GDP per capita decreased by 5
percent. However, Mexico recovered very fast after the shock in the
ﬁrst two quarters in 1995 while in the 2001 crisis, the recovery was
stagnant.
One of the goals of the current study is to compare the 2008 crisis
with previous crises. In this sense, the 2008-2009 crisis looks like the
1995 crisis. However, it is too soon to predict how Mexico will recover
from this crisis. In the 1995 crisis, Mexico could recover fast through
NAFTA, a weak exchange rate and a booming US economy. Those
conditions are not currently valid. On the other hand, the 2001 crisis
took longer to vanish. According to the IMF, Mexico is predicted toTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 181
grow less than 2 percent in 2010. It looks like the recovery process of
the 2008 crisis will resemble more the 2001-2003 crisis.
3. Data and Facts
The employment data to be analyzed comes from the Labor Force Sur-
vey (called Encuesta nacional de empleo urbano, ENEU, until 2004,
and Encuesta nacional de ocupaci´ on y empleo, ENOE, thereafter). The
Labor Force Survey is a quarterly household survey and it is similar
in structure to the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the United
States. For example, households are interviewed for ﬁve consecutive
quarters and then leave the sample. The ENEU survey period includes
1988-2004 and it includes large urban cities, hence it is only represen-
tative at the urban level and not at the national level. In the 1995: I
crisis, 16 cities can be used as a panel if the panel starts before 1992,
otherwise up to 32 cities can be used as a panel. In the 2000: IV crisis
34 cities can be used as a panel.1 Nonetheless, the main advantage
of using ENEU is its large sample size. In each quarter approximately
130 000 households are interviewed. Moreover, the survey includes
rich demographic information as well as rich employment informa-
tion (industry, occupation, hours, formal/informal). I use the Labor
Force Survey instead of the Income and Expenditure Survey because
the latter is conducted every two years, and it is possible that the
labor market adjusts rapidly causing an underestimation of the true
eﬀect of the crisis. In order to increase the power of the statistical
calculations, I will use quarterly data from the Labor Force Surveys.
The Labor Force Survey changed in 2004, and the new Labor
Force Survey is representative at the national level. I will use the
new Labor Force Survey (ENOE) in order to estimate the impacts
of the current crisis on employment. Even though ENEU and ENOE
have diﬀerent sampling methods, I will restrict the ENOE sample to
the same cities appearing in 2001 ENEU.2 Hence, I try to make the
results as comparable as possible across years.
1 1987-1991, 16 cities; 1992: I - 1992: II, 32 cities; 1992: III - 1993 III, 34
cities; 1993: IV - 1994: III, 37 cities; 1994: IV - 1995: IV, 39 cities; 1996: I -
1996: III, 41 cities; 1996: IV - 1997: IV, 43 cities; 1998: I - 1998: IV, 44 cities;
1999: I - 2000: II, 45 cities; 2000: III - 2000: IV, 47 cities; 2001: I - 2002: II, 48
cities; 2002: III - 2002: IV, 47 cities; 2003: I - 2003: II, 48 cities; 2003: III, 37
cities; 2003: IV, 36 cities; 2004: I - 2004: IV, 34 cities.
2 I also drop from the analysis all those localities with less than 2 500 people
because ENEU focuses only on urban areas.182 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
The data on GDP at the national level comes from the National
Statistical Oﬃce, Instituto Nacional de Estad´ ıstica y Geograf´ ıa, IN-
EGI.3 Yearly GDP at the national level can be found starting 1980,
while yearly GDP at the regional level can be found starting 1993. I
use only GDP at the national level in my estimation below.
An economic crisis has the potential eﬀect of reducing the size of
the labor force, increasing unemployment and changing wages. Hence,
the outcome variables of interest are employment-population ratios,
unemployment rates, the share of workers in the formal sector, and
wages.4
The share of formal sector workers is important because only
in this sector are workers entitled to social security. For example, a
drastic decrease in the number of workers in this sector could mean
a decrease in the health status of the overall population. In terms
of tax revenue, it also means that the Social Security Institution has
less money to invest in medical technologies and general supplies.
4. Empirical Strategy
Obtaining the causal eﬀect of an economic crisis on employment is ex-
tremely diﬃcult. The fundamental problem of causal inference arises:
What would be the outcome in the absence of a crisis? Finding a good
counterfactual is hard. Suppose that there is an economic shock that
aﬀects males under 25 years old. If we believe (generally correctly)
that diﬀerent demographic groups are imperfect substitutes between
each other, a change in employment or wages to males under 25 will
necessarily aﬀect other demographic groups. Hence, any other com-
parison group is invalid.
Instead of focusing in the hard question of causal eﬀects of macro-
economic shocks, I restrict my attention to a reduced form equation
that relates macroeconomic shock trends with employment and wages.
The strategy relies on constructing an event study. The event study
3 www.inegi.org.mx
4 I use the term formal sector workers as those workers who receive social
insurance from their main job, while informal workers as workers who are not
entitled to social insurance. Even though the informal sector is heterogenous I do
not classify informal workers as salaried and self-employed given that the focus
of the present study is to determine the eﬀects of the crises in the formal sector,
not how informal sector employment changes. The reader can consult the studies
of Bosch and Maloney (2007) and Rodr´ ıguez (2007) for more information about
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methodology has been widely used in labor economics (see for exam-
ple the works of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993 and Kaplan,
Martinez, and Robertson, 2005). We know the crisis periods, so an
easy way to observe the impacts of each crisis is just plotting the ef-
fects on employment for a determined number of quarters before and
after the start of each macroeconomic shock. The great advantage
of this exercise is that each macroeconomic shock can be compared
under the same axis, so that diﬀerences in eﬀects are more easily seen.
The method consists on estimating the following regression for each
outcome variable Y (in logs):






φjk · 1(Event = k)t + εjt (1)
The regression can be estimated for each demographic group j
separately. It is important to mention that regression (1) is absorbing
any permanent diﬀerence across demographic and regional groups in
the sample (αjr) as well as any seasonal eﬀect (βq). Qtr is a dummy
variable for each quarter. If the coeﬃcients ϕ are normalized to pe-
riod -1, then the coeﬃcients are interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the
outcome variable on that quarter with respect to period -1. The vari-
able Event is constructed as a dummy variable whenever these are k
periods from the start of the macroeconomic shock. Although this
method provides an elegant way to observe the eﬀects of macroeco-
nomic shocks, the great disadvantage is that it lacks a clear coun-
terfactual. This is because all demographic groups are aﬀected by
the event at the same time. Hence, the implicit counterfactual is the
trend before the event.
The elasticity of desired outcomes to changes in GDP is denoted
as
ˆ φk−ˆ φ−1
∆%GDP . The reference period elasticity is taken as that of the
quarter before the crisis started. This number will be important in




This section analyzes the evolution of important labor market out-
comes for diﬀerent demographic groups. Given the lack of comparable184 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
data for the whole period of analysis, I present the evolution of dif-
ferent outcomes from 1988-2004 (the ﬁnal year of ENEU). In the next
subsection, I compare outcomes for the three crises using an event
study.
Figures A2 through A5 show the trends of the outcomes of in-
terest. Figure A2 shows the evolution for males and females of the
employment-to-population rate, unemployment rate, and the share
of formal sector workers in total employment and the ratio of wages
between the formal and informal sector. In terms of the employment-
to-population ratio, males are more aﬀected than females. This is
intuitive given that females are increasing their labor force participa-
tion regardless of the economic environment. Nonetheless, ﬁndings in
the US and Mexico show that females are becoming more like males
(see for example, Arceo and Campos, 2009 for Mexico and Blau and
Kahn, 2007 for the US) which means that the current and future
crises should aﬀect also the labor force participation of women. The
behavior of the unemployment rate is very similar for both men and
women. In both 1995 and 2001 crises, the unemployment rate in-
creases by close to 50 percent for men and women. Similarly, the
share of the formal sector in total employment decreases by close to
10 percent during crisis periods. However, the graphs show that the
2001 crisis took longer to reach its minimum level than the 1995 crisis.
An important aspect to mention in ﬁgure A2 panel C is the
evolution of wages. The graph depicts the evolution of the ratio of
hourly wage in the formal sector over the hourly wage in the informal
sector. This ratio is generally larger than 1, especially for women,
implying a larger (on average) hourly wage in the formal sector than
in the informal sector. In crises periods, when there is a decrease in
the share in the formal sector in total employment, the relative wage
of formal sector workers in terms of informal workers increases, or
at least it does not decrease. This is consistent with a model where
labor supplies in the formal and informal sector are related, and where
an increase in the supply of workers in the informal sector causes a
decrease in their wage. This logic will be used later in the theoretical
framework.
Figure A3 shows the employment-to-population ratio for demo-
graphic groups by age and education for all workers (there is no dis-
tinction between males and females). The ﬁgure shows that employ-
ment level of young workers is more sensible to changes in the eco-
nomic environment than that of older workers, especially in the 2001
crisis. There are no diﬀerences in eﬀects across education groups.
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by age and education for all workers. In contrast to the employment-
to-population ratio, the unemployment rate increases for all groups
during all crises. If we compare changes in percent terms (rather than
in absolute numbers) the most sensitive groups in the 1995 crisis are
workers in their prime years and workers with only secondary school
education (the unemployment rate increases more than 50 percent).
Nevertheless, in absolute terms the increase in the unemployment of
young workers increases by up to 7 percentage points in the 1995 crisis
and by 4 percentage points in the 2001 crisis. Although the 2001 crisis
was not as deep as the 1995 crisis, the unemployment trend for young
individuals is the same in both cases. It seems that young workers
are becoming more sensitive to changes in the economic environment.
Mexico does not have an unemployment insurance scheme. Wor-
kers in the formal sector pay payroll taxes and receive health insurance
while workers in the informal sector do not pay payroll taxes and do
not receive health insurance from their employers. In the presence of
a macroeconomic shock, one can argue that the formal sector adjusts
through decreases in the rate of hiring and also in the destruction
of jobs. We expect these workers to be out of the labor force, un-
employed or ﬁnding a job in the informal sector. If wages adjust to
these changes, then after an increase in the supply of workers in the
informal sector, we should expect a decrease in wages in that sector.
In order to analyze whether these hypotheses are plausible, ﬁgure
A5 presents the share of workers in the formal sector over time and
the relative wage between workers in the formal and informal sectors.
Across age groups, the share of workers in the formal sector decreases
and this decrease is approximately equal to 10 percent. At the same
time the relative wage increases by less than 10 percent. Across edu-
cation groups we have a similar story. The 2001 crisis seem to have
had a larger impact in the formal sector than the 1995 crisis. Hence,
it is not clear whether the 2001 crisis aﬀected the proportion of work-
ers in the formal sector or something else is at stake given that the
share of workers in the formal sector declined later than the start of
the crisis.
In sum, ﬁgures A2 through A5 depict a clear picture of what hap-
pens after a macroeconomic shock. Males leave the labor force more
rapidly than women. Unemployment aﬀects all demographic groups
but especially young workers. The share of workers in the formal
sector decreases for all groups while the relative wage between formal
and informal workers increases slightly. The next section quantiﬁes
the magnitude of such eﬀects and compares them with the 2008 crisis.186 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
5.2. Event Study
5.2.1. Eﬀects on outcome variables
This section compares the current 2008 crisis with the previous two
crises. I order employment outcomes according to time occurrence
and analyze whether the eﬀects of the current crisis on employment
are similar to the eﬀects from the previous crises. Instead of focusing
on broad groups, I will analyze patterns by speciﬁc subgroups. I
analyze groups by gender-age, and gender-education.
First, ﬁgure A6 shows the event study for GDP and GDP per
capita. The ﬁgure shows that GDP decreased 10 percent in the 1995
crisis while the 2001 crisis GDP decreased by 5 percent. The current
crisis looks very similar to the 1995 crisis in terms of GDP. In order to
obtain the elasticity of the desired outcome with respect to changes
in GDP, we only need to divide the eﬀect in speciﬁc quarters by the
estimate in GDP. For example, if the unemployment rate increases by
50 percent and GDP decreases by 10 percent, it implies an elasticity of
unemployment rate with respect to GDP close to -5. In what follows,
I will analyze ﬁrst the eﬀects on diﬀerent outcomes and then I will
calculate diﬀerent elasticities.
Figures A7 through A11 show the results of the event study for
all demographic groups and the outcomes of interest.5,6 The event
study helps to compare all the macroeconomic shocks under the same
axis.7 The eﬀects are in percent terms such that the elasticity of the
outcome with respect to GDP changes is obtained by dividing the ef-
fect of the outcome eﬀect by the GDP eﬀect. The ﬁgure also shows
5, In order to facilitate the reading of the graphs, I smoothed the outcome
variable using a simple moving average with one lead and lag term and uniform
weights. I use this method in order to avoid oversmoothing the outcome variable.
6 Figures do not include standard errors or conﬁdence intervals. The inclu-
sion of conﬁdence intervals complicates the reading of each graph. Nonetheless,
standard errors are small and similar for each event period. For example, the
standard error for event period 2 in employment, unemployment, share of formal
across groups (on average) is equal to .01, .08, .02 respectively. Hence, estimates
are precise for employment-population ratios and unemployment rates, However
the estimate of the share of workers in the formal sector is too noisy. The current
study focuses more in the economic signiﬁcance of macroeconomic shocks rather
than statistical signiﬁcance. Certainly a loss of 10% in formal jobs for some type
of workers is economically signiﬁcant.
7 Each dot in the graph is obtained from the coeﬃcients φk−φ−1 in regression
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that the current crisis aﬀects more young males and females than pre-
vious crises. The larger eﬀect on young workers can be interpreted as
meaning that now average education is higher and young workers can
substitute work for schooling in crises periods and that they can suf-
fer unemployment rapidly after a negative shock. Prime-age workers
do not decrease too much their employment status in previous crises
compared to the 2008 crisis. Women do not seem to be aﬀected in
previous crises. However, the current crisis has caused a decline in
employment for this group as well. As noted by previous research,
women’s labor supply is becoming more similar to men’s labor sup-
ply. Thus, the current crisis has had a larger eﬀect on women’s labor
force participation and employment than previous crises. Figure A8
shows the change in employment-to-population ratio by educational
group. Male workers with less than secondary school education were
the most aﬀected in the 1995 and 2008 crises. In sum, ﬁgures A7
and A8 indicate that young workers and unskilled workers are the
most likely to leave the labor force and lose jobs in response to a
macroeconomic shock.
Figures A9 and A10 show the event study for unemployment
by age and educational group respectively. Again the 2008 crisis
looks like the 1995 crisis for males and females. In both crises, the
unemployment rate increased by close to 50 percent. As previous
ﬁgures show, young and unskilled workers are the most aﬀected by
the 2008 crisis. However, males are more aﬀected than females in
terms of unemployment. It is important to notice that highly skilled
workers are not aﬀected much by the current crisis as by previous
ones.
Figures A11 and A12 show the impacts for the share of workers
in the formal sector by age and educational group respectively. Both
1995 and 2008 crises are more or less similar, although it seems that
the 1995 crisis had a larger negative eﬀect on the share of formal work-
ers. Moreover, the share in the formal sector reaches its minimum 3-4
quarters later than what it takes for the GDP to reach its minimum.
Hence it is too soon to say something about how large the dip will be
for the share of workers in the formal sector. Nevertheless, so far the
results show alarge decline. Young and prime-age male workers have
decreased their share in the formal sector by 5 percent, while young
female workers have decreased their share by close to 10 percent. In
terms of educational groups, unskilled female workers have decreased
their share in the formal sector by 10% approximately, while workers
with secondary education have decreased their share in the formal
sector by 10 percent. On the other hand, males and females with188 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
at least a high school education are not as strongly aﬀected. The
evidence of ﬁgures A9 through A12 indicates that the 2008 crisis has
aﬀected unskilled workers relatively more than skilled workers.
The share of formal sector employment in total employment can
decrease either by a decrease in employment in the formal sector or
an increase in informal sector employment, holding constant the level
of employment in the formal sector. In order to analyze whether
changes in the share of workers in the formal sector are driven by a
decrease in employment in the formal sector, ﬁgure A13 shows the
event study of formal employment for prime-age males, and for males
and females with secondary education. The ﬁgure shows a decline
in formal employment for both the 1995 and the 2008 crises. Hence,
the fall in the share of the formal sector is both caused by a decrease
in employment in the formal sector and an increase in informal em-
ployment. The fall in formal employment is especially relevant for
unskilled workers.8
How do formal and informal wages react with these changes in the
labor market? Figure A13 panels D through F include the percent
change in the relative wage of formal workers in terms of informal
workers. After a fall in formal sector employment and an increase
in informal sector employment, the relative wage increases. This is
consistent with the view that informal sector expands at the cost of
a lower wage which increases the relative wage diﬀerence between
formal and informal workers.
In sum, unskilled workers are more aﬀected by macroeconomic
shocks than highly skilled workers. Young workers are more aﬀected
than prime-age or older workers. After the occurrence of a macroe-
conomic shock, some workers lose their jobs or decide to leave the
labor force (especially young workers), unemployment increases for
all type of workers, employment in the informal sector expands rela-
tive to the formal sector, and relative wages of formal sector workers
in terms of informal workers increase. These facts will be taken into
consideration in the model I develop below.
5.2.2. Elasticities of outcome variables with respect to GDP
This section estimates the elasticity of outcome variables with respect
to GDP. The elasticity can be estimated using the coeﬃcients in re-
8 The appendix A shows that workers who at least completed high school are
not aﬀected as unskilled workers. In general, the decrease in formal employment
is mainly driven by jobs lost for unskilled workers.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 189
gression (1) and the coeﬃcients of a similar regression for GDP. The
elasticity for each period t is estimated by dividing the percent change
in the outcome variable Y with respect to the change in GDP:
ˆ φY
t − ˆ φY
−1
ˆ φGDP
t − ˆ φGDP
−1
(2)
The results are shown in table A1 for diﬀerent elasticities with
respect to 3 quarters after the start of the crisis (event period 2).
The denominator is taken from total GDP and not GDP per capita.
In general the table summarizes the results previously shown. The
employment level of young workers is becoming more sensitive to the
economic environment. The elasticities increased substantially be-
tween 1995 and 2008, especially for males. Unskilled workers are the
group most aﬀected by macroeconomic shocks in terms of leaving the
labor force, unemployment, and employment in the formal sector.
In fact, the current crisis has not aﬀected total formal employment
for highly-skilled workers (the elasticity of formal employment with
respect to GDP changes is negative). In order to hire highly-skilled
workers in the formal sector, ﬁrms invest in training programs, screen-
ing process, etc. This causes hiring costs and ﬁring costs to be higher
for highly skilled workers than for unskilled workers, and as a con-
sequence formal ﬁrms do not terminate employment for both types
of workers equally. More research is needed to investigate the actual
mechanisms of labor adjustment across ﬁrms.
6. Theoretical Framework
6.1. Model
The decision of how to model the impacts of labor market policies
on wages and employment when there are two sectors is complicated.
Most of the literature on informal sector modeling focuses on what
determines the size of the informal sector (see for example Loayza,
1996, or G¨ erxhani, 2004 for a review of the literature). Modern mod-
els include frictions such as in the work of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) or Albrecht, Navarro and Vroman (2009) to evaluate the ef-
fects of labor market policies. However, a great disadvantage of these
models is that they generally don’t determine wages and employment
at the same time. For example, the literature evaluating the size of190 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
the informal sector takes wages as given and the size of the informal
sector is taken as endogenous to labor regulation. In search models,
the wages will be determined by Nash bargaining between the em-
ployers and employees. A recent model developed by Levy (2008) in-
cludes a competitive model determining both wages and employment.
However, the model in Levy (2008) predicts that wages in the formal
sector are equal to wages in the informal sector and that in response to
macroeconomic shocks wages are aﬀected and not employment.9 An-
other model based on competitive equilibrium of the informal sector
is due to Marrufo (2001). Her model is similar in spirit to the model
I develop below. However, given that she is interested on the inci-
dence of payroll taxation, she includes capital, models labor supply
responses and also models responses in product demand. The model
has two disadvantages: the model is complex which makes it harder
to understand the main intuition of the model, and focuses only on
changes in payroll taxes and not on macroeconomic shocks. Hence,
the models previously developed do not provide a simple and uni-
ﬁed framework about how to explainlabor market ﬂuctuations, wages
and employment, in response to macroeconomic shocks or changes in
payroll taxes.
In this section, I provide a simple competitive framework to de-
note the interactions between the formal and informal sector. I follow
the competitive model framework (Gruber, 1997; Katz, 1996) in order
to determine wages and employment in equilibrium in both the formal
and informal sectors. The goal is to understand how the equilibrium
changes when there is a macroeconomic shock. Moreover, the ﬁnal
goal of this exercise is to provide policy recommendations, assuming
the elasticities of labor supply and demand are known. Nevertheless,
there is little work in Mexico and Latin America about the magni-
tudes of these elasticities, so the policy recommendations need to take
this caution into consideration.
The model I present is a partial equilibrium model. Labor de-
mand for a particular skill equals labor supply for that skill. There
is one good or product in the economy, and labor is the only factor
used to produce that good. It is a partial equilibrium model in the
sense that I do not model how the labor movements of a worker with
a particular skill aﬀect workers with other types of skills. A general
9 Unless one is willing to assume that wage rigidities cause employment in the
formal sector to be aﬀected rather than wages. Hence, a macroeconomic shock
decreases employment in the formal sector, increases employment in the formal
sector and reduces wages for informal workers. Such a framework is very similar
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equilibrium model that takes these movements is out of the scope of
this paper. Moreover, I assume that demand for the product is per-
fectly elastic so that labor ﬂuctuations or macroeconomic shocks do
not change the price of the product.
In this partial equilibrium model, I assume there are two sectors
in the economy, formal and informal. The demand for formal sector
workers depends only on wages for formal sector workers, DF(wF). In
equilibrium, the demand for formal workers needs to equal the labor
supply of formal workers. The labor supply depends on wages in
both the formal and informal sector, SF(wF,w I). The labor supply
of formal sector workers is increasing with respect to its own wage
but decreasing with respect to the informal sector wage. This labor
supply reﬂects the fact that a higher wage in the informal sector will
cause some workers to shift out the formal sector into the informal
sector. The absolute value of the labor supply elasticities are denoted
as εF
wF and εF
wI. There is little knowledge about the magnitude of
these elasticities. We know that labor supply elasticities are small,
and close to zero for males in their prime age, but little is known
about the labor supply elasticities for each sector. It is plausible to
argue that εF
wF >ε F
wI or that formal sector workers are more sensitive
to changes in their own wage than in the informal sector wage.
Demand for labor in the informal sector depends only on wages
in the informal sector, DI(wI). Supply of informal sector workers de-
pends on wages in the formal and informal sector, SI(wF,w I). How-
ever, diﬀerent parameters for labor supply elasticities in the formal
and informal sector increases the complexity of the problem. Instead,
we can use the fact that total labor in the informal sector plus labor
in the formal sector is equal to total labor in the economy. I assume
that there is no unemployment in the economy such that total labor
is completely inelastic, S = SF + SI. Hence, labor supply in the
informal sector is just obtained as SI(wF,w I)=S − SF(wF,w I).
This assumption requires more explanation. This assumption implies
that labor supply in both sectors will adjust in order to reach an
equilibrium. The model allows for diﬀerent wages across sectors, and
they are diﬀerent given labor demand and supply. In other words,
there are some workers who place a greater value on formal sector
employment than on informal sector employment, and ﬁrms in the
formal sector are more productive, and hence demand more workers
at similar wage than informal sector ﬁrms causing wages to be diﬀer-
ent across sectors. Of course, there is the question of why we assume
there is an informal sector in the ﬁrst place. The current model’s
implicit assumption is that total demand in the formal sector is less192 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
than total supply of workers even at a very low wage. Hence, the
model by construction assumes the existence of an informal sector.10
The labor supply framework is consistent with ﬁndings that the
informal sector is both composed of voluntary and involuntary em-
ployment in that sector. Maloney (2004) claims that workers in the
informal sector are there given personal preferences, or that given in-
dividual preferences they may not be better oﬀ in the formal sector.
However, the informal sector is heterogenous. Bosch and Maloney
(2007) and Rodr´ ıguez (2007) ﬁnd that informal sector employment
increases in crises periods and that informal sector workers do not
frequently shift into formal sector jobs or that informal sector work-
ers move within the informal sector. Both results are consistent with
the view that labor supply in the informal sector will depend on in-
formal and formal sector wages, that total labor supply is inelastic,
and that workers shift between sectors if there is not enough labor
demand at current wages. The current model implies that informal
sector wages are lower than formal sector wages, which is consistent
with ﬁndings that wages for workers that move from the formal sector
into the informal sector decrease on average by 13%, see for example
Alcaraz, Chiquiar, and Ramos (2008).
The elasticity of labor demand in each sector is written as ηx
wx
for x = F,I. Although there are no empirical estimates for these
parameters, it is plausible that ηF
wF >η I
wI for the same proportional
change in each wage. Demand in the formal sector is not as ﬂexible
as in the informal sector. Hence, given the same percent change in
the wage it is likely that demand in the informal sector changes by
more than in the formal sector.
Equilibrium in the labor market for a particular skill is obtained




DI(wI)=S − SF(wF,w I)
which determine the optimum wages, (w∗
F,w ∗
I), and determine the
size of the formal and informal sector, SF(w∗
F,w ∗
I). The ﬁnal goal of
10 A model at the individual level is beyond the scope of the paper. However, we
can interpret the model as implying that individual preferences are heterogenous.
Some individuals put more weight on leisure than others. Hence, some individuals
will prefer the informal sector rather than the formal sector even with a lower wage
in the informal sector. This rational decision does not leave them worse oﬀ.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 193
the current model is to understand labor ﬂuctuations when there are
macroeconomic shocks and changes in payroll taxes. I model these
eﬀects as follows:
DF[wF(1 − s)](1 + AF)=SF(wF,w I) (4)
DI[wI](1 + AI)=S − SF(wF,w I)
where s is a subsidy as a percent of the worker’s wage and AF, AI
represent macroeconomic shocks as a percent of labor demand.
Totally diﬀerentiating both equations, deﬁning the percent eﬀect
of macroeconomic shocks and subsidy as θF, θI and sF, and ﬁnally











































































If labor supply in the formal sector and informal sector are not
related by informal sector wages, , and we ﬁnd the traditional formulas














































The idea of imposing a subsidy for workers, especially unskilled,
in a contracting environment is not new (see for example, Ferreira,
11 Appendix B includes the derivation of the model.194 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Prennushi, and Ravallion, 1999 and Phelps, 1994). The added value
of the model is that it provides conditions for the wage subsidy to
stimulate employment in the formal sector. For example, in terms of
equation (5), the eﬀect on formal employment of a subsidy will depend
largely on the magnitude of the demand elasticity in the formal and
informal sector and the labor supply elasticity in the formal sector.
The next subsection interprets more thoroughly the implications of
the model.
6.2. Interpretation and Implications
Although equations (5) are diﬃcult to interpret given the number
of parameters, it is possible to say a few things. Given a negative
shock that aﬀects equally both the formal and informal sector, the
eﬀect on formal (informal) wages decreases (in absolute value) the
higher the elasticity of demand for formal (informal) workers is and
the higher the labor supply elasticity of formal (informal) workers is
(holding constant other parameters). The eﬀect on labor demand will
be lower the higher the elasticity of labor demand and the higher the
elasticity of labor supply of informal workers. The interpretation of
these results implies that formal sector workers will not be aﬀected
either in wages or employment because ﬁrms in the formal sector are
not greatly aﬀected by macroeconomic shocks (perfectly elastic de-
mand). If demand is not perfectly elastic, then the eﬀect will depend
on other elasticities. For example, less elastic labor supply in the
formal sector implies that the shock can be absorbed by wages rather
than employment, and the same applies for informal sector workers.
By the same token, if labor supply elasticity with respect to formal
sector wages is greater than for informal wages, this implies that em-
ployment in the formal sector will be more aﬀected than would be
the case with higher elasticity for informal wages.
Figure A14 describes the eﬀects on wages and employment for
diﬀerent elasticities under the assumption that there is a negative
macroeconomic shock to both sectors equal to -10% (the same shock
as to GDP) and there are no changes in wage subsidies. The y-axis
is the percent change in the outcome, the x-axis is the labor demand
elasticity in the formal sector (ηF
wF ), IS refers to Informal Labor Sup-
ply elasticity (εF
wI), ID refers to Informal Labor Demand elasticity
(ηI
wI ) and FS refers to Formal Labor Supply elasticity (εF
wF ). There is
little knowledge on the values of these elasticities for Mexico or Latin
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for men and women in Mexico in 2000 and ﬁnd that the elasticity for
men is around 0.10 and that for women it is around 0.6. However they
do not estimate labor supply equations for both formal and informal
sector. Given the empirical estimates in the US and other developed
countries, it is likely that both of these elasticities are lower than 1
and closer to zero. It is also possible that labor supply elasticity for
formal sector wages is higher than for informal sector wages. The
labor demand elasticities are more complicated to estimate. Hamer-
mesh (1993) reports that the constant-output demand elasticity is
around 0.33. But the model described above requires demand elas-
ticities allowing for output to vary. This elasticity is obtained by
dividing 1/0.33 which implies a labor demand elasticity of close to
3. Labor demand elasticity in Mexico and Latin America is probably
lower than the one found for the US, given that there are more labor
regulations in these countries than in the US. There are no estimates
for the labor demand elasticity in the informal sector but it should
not be too diﬀerent from the formal sector elasticity and probably
larger given lack of labor regulation in this sector.
Figure A14 implies interesting details about the possible mag-
nitude of labor supply and demand elasticities. Panels A through
C show the eﬀect of a macroeconomic shock on formal and informal
wages and formal employment for diﬀerent elasticities. We know from
ﬁgure A13 that formal employment has decreased by close to 10% for
workers with secondary education or ages 25-50. But as workers with
at least a high school education have not been aﬀected, the change
in formal employment is close to -6 percent. Relative wages between
formal and informal sector have increased by between 2 and 5 percent.
In the appendix A, I show that wages in the formal sector have de-
clined by between 8 and 10 percent while in the informal sector they
have decreased by between 10 and 15 percent. These numbers will
be used in order to determine a plausible value for the labor demand
and supply elastiticies.
Panel A in ﬁgure A14 indicates a large drop in formal sector
wages when labor demand elasticity is low for both the formal and
informal sector. As empirical data do not support such large drops
in formal sector wages relative to informal sector wages, it is likely
that both formal labor supply elasticity and formal labor demand
elasticity are not zero or close to zero. Given that most estimates
are close to each other for large values of the formal labor demand
elasticity, it is hard to say something about the plausible values for
those elasticities. We need to look at more evidence.
Panel B implies that a higher informal-sector labor demand elas-196 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
ticity causes a lower drop in wages in the informal sector. Hence, we
can rule out large values of the labor demand elasticity in the infor-
mal sector. A higher elasticity of labor supply in the formal sector
increases the eﬀect on wages in the informal sector. In the empirical
analysis described above, I ﬁnd that wages in the informal sector de-
crease relative to formal sector wages by a small proportion (2-5%),
while wages in the informal sector have decreased by 10-15 percent.
This implies that labor demand elasticity for informal workers is low
and that labor supply elasticity for formal workers is greater than the
labor supply elasticity for informal workers.
Panel C shows the eﬀect of the macroeconomic shock in formal
employment. From the ﬁgure, we can rule out large values of the
labor demand elasticity in the formal sector given that the empirical
data shows a drop in formal employment. This is consistent with
what we ﬁnd in panel B. In fact, it is likely that the elasticity of labor
demand in the formal sector is greater than 0.5 but lower than 1.5,
since we observe a decline in formal employment of close to 6 percent.
In sum, panels A through C in ﬁgure A14 depict a clear picture
of the plausible values for the elasticities. The labor supply elasticity
in the informal sector is zero or close to zero while the labor sup-
ply elasticity in the formal sector is larger, probably between 0.5 and
1. The labor demand elasticities in the formal and informal sector
are close to 1, a surprising aspect given that we expected evidence
pointing towards larger elasticity values for the informal sector. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible that the labor demand elasticity is higher in
the informal sector than in the formal sector but that it is not an
order of magnitude higher.
6.3. Implications for Public Policies
In the model described above there are two ways to deter the eﬀects
of a negative macroeconomic shock. One way is to implement wage
subsidies for labor. These subsidies can take the form of direct wage
subsidies or a decrease in payroll taxes (although the model does not
assign a value to social security beneﬁts, or in other words the model
assumes that workers do not value social security contributions). The
other public policy option is to decrease proﬁt taxes such that for-
mal sector ﬁrms do not decrease wages or employment as much as
they could. In the model above, a decrease in proﬁt taxes can be
interpreted as a less negative shock in A.
First of all, the ﬁrst question is related to the empirical evi-
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other Latin American countries. Gruber (1997) ﬁnds that lower pay-
roll taxes in Chile were shifted into higher wages, especially for skilled
workers, with no positive employment eﬀects, which is consistent with
a perfectly inelastic labor supply. Kugler and Kugler (2009) study the
increase in payroll taxes in Colombia in 1993. Payroll taxes increased
by 10.3 percent. The rationale is that if wages are rigid downward
(and not upward as in Gruber’s case) then the increase in payroll taxes
could have an eﬀect on employment as well. Kugler and Kugler (2009)
ﬁnd that the increase in payroll taxes led to a 2 percent decrease in
wages by and a 4.5% decrease in employment (and the eﬀect was
greater for unskilled workers, consistent with the idea of wage rigid-
ity downwards or minimum wage). On the other hand, Fr´ ıas (2008)
analyzes the Social Security reform in Mexico in 1997. She ﬁnds that
the 1997 reform, which decreased payroll taxes, increased wages with-
out an eﬀect on employment, except for large manufacturing plants
which saw some small gains in employment.
In order to analyze the performance of a wage subsidy in the
presence of a macroeconomic shock, I simulate equation (5) with dif-
ferent values of sF and θF. I do the simulations with elasticities of
labor supply in the formal and informal sector equal to 0.75 and 0
respectively, while labor demand elasticity in the informal sector is
set to 1. Figure A15 presents the results of the simulation. The ﬁg-
ure includes 4 diﬀerent scenarios, a subsidy of 5 and 10%, and then
a decrease in the tax rate paid by ﬁrms equal to 1% of demand in
the formal sector. Firms in the formal sector get a -9% shock with
this decrease in the tax rate. The ﬁgure shows that a wage subsidy of
5% can decrease the negative eﬀect of the economic shock in terms of
higher wages and more employment in the formal sector as compared
to the benchmark case of no subsidy. For a labor demand elasticity in
the formal sector close to 1, the negative eﬀect is decreased by close
to 50% in terms of wages and employment.12
The second question to ask is related to whether a decrease in
payroll taxes makes sense as opposed to a decrease in the proﬁt tax. In
the short-run, a wage subsidy is superior in terms of employed labor
to decreases in proﬁt taxes for two reasons: 1) A ﬁrm can modify
capital and labor with a decrease in the proﬁt tax, in other words, we
only have an “output eﬀect”, 2) a wage subsidy has both substitution
12 I do not deal with the eﬀects of the tax revenue used to ﬁnance the increase
in wage subsidies. The point of the model is just to show the eﬀects of shocks
in wages and employment, and then how a wage subsidy aﬀects those outcomes.
A general equilibrium model that includes the responses to taxes is beyond the
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and output eﬀects. These considerations imply that governments, at
least in the short run, can mitigate the formal employment eﬀects
of a macroeconomic shock through wage subsidies. Nevertheless, the
analysis above is meant to be used for short-run analyses given the
possible eﬀects of labor regulation and proﬁt taxes on the creation of
formal ﬁrms and formal employment in the long-run.13
A possible reform in adjustment costs that allow a more ﬂexible
hiring and ﬁring process can exacerbate the decrease in employment
when there is a negative macroeconomic shock. However, lower labor
regulation can accelerate the job creation process in the recovery pe-
riod. Hence, a way to increase formal sector jobs during the recovery
period is to decrease regulation of labor. In order to avoid welfare
losses for workers in periods of future crises, an unemployment insur-
ance scheme should be alternatively discussed.
7. Conclusions
This paper studies the empirical and theoretical eﬀects of macroeco-
nomic shocks in employment and wages for the case of Mexico. Using
an event study of the 1995, 2001 and 2008 crises, I ﬁnd that young and
unskilled workers are the most aﬀected by an economic shock: they
are the most sensitive to changes in employment (they either add to
the unemployed or they decide to leave the labor force). Moreover,
women’s labor force participation resembles men’s labor force partic-
ipation in the current crisis. Also, highly skilled workers are not as
aﬀected by the current crisis as unskilled workers. In particular, there
is no evidence that highly skilled workers are contributing to the in-
crease in the informal sector employment or that they are suﬀering a
signiﬁcant decrease in formal sector employment.
In order to make policy recommendations, I derive a theoretical
model in a partial equilibrium setting. The theoretical model pays
special attention to changes in the proportion of workers in the formal
13 The model presented above does not consider long-run issues, and this is
certainly an important aspect to analyze. For example, Besley and Burgess (2004)
analyze the long run eﬀects of labor market legislation in India. States across time
approved a legislation called the Industries Dispute Act which was passed in each
state with diﬀerent amendments, so that in the end some states ended up with
pro-labor legislation while others with pro-employer legislation. Diﬀerences were
stark: states that passed a pro-worker legislation did not grow in manufacturing
employment, while pro-employer states did show an increase in manufacturing
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sector to workers in the informal sector, and wages in the formal and
informal sector. The theoretical ﬁndings imply that the elasticities
of labor supply in the formal and informal sector are close to 0.75
and 0 respectively, and that labor demand elasticities in the formal
and informal sector are both close to 1. A negative macroeconomic
shock of 10%, would require a wage subsidy of close to 10% in order
to avoid a change in employment in the formal sector.
The current project does not address the mechanisms behind
the negative eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks. Future research should
address what type of employment young workers do and in what ac-
tivities they are involved in the absence of employment. It is possible
that young workers do not go back to school but spend time in illegal
activities or criminal behavior. If this hypothesis is correct, address-
ing the problem of employment in young workers has large positive
externalities.
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Appendix A
Figure A1
GDP and GDP per capita. Mexico 1980-2000
Note: GDP obtained from Statistical Oﬃce (INEGI). GDP detrended in 1993
prices (MXP millions). The series changed in 2008:I. Hence, I use information from
1980:I-2007:IV and then I use the new series in 2003 prices in order to obtain
growth rates for 2008 and 2009. I apply these growth rates to the original series
to obtain the series 1980-2009. Population for the period 1990-2009 is obtained
from Conapo. In order to obtain population for the period 1980-1989, I use a
constant growth rate using 1980 population data from the Statistical Oﬃce.202 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A2
Employment, unemployment, share and relative wages
in the formal sector: Males and females
A. Employment/Population: Males
B. Unemployment rate: MalesTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 203
Figure A2
(continued)
C. Share formal and wages: Males
D. Employment/Population: Females204 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A2
(continued)
E. Unemployment rate: Females
F. Share formal and wages: Females
Note: Data constructed using ENEU data. Shades represent crises periods.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 205
Figure A3
Employment/Population by age and education
A. 15-24
B. 25-50206 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A3
(continued)
C. 50 and over




F. High school or more
Note: Data constructed using ENEU data. Shades represent crises periods.208 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A4
Unemployment rate by age and education
A. 15-24
B. 25-50THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 209
Figure A4
(continued)
C. 50 and over




F. High school or more
Note: Data constructed using ENEU data. Shades represent crises periods.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 211
Figure A5
Share of workers in formal sector and relative
wage between formal and informal workers
A. Age: 15-24
B. Age: 25-50212 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A5
(continued)
C. Age: 50 and over
D. Education: Less than secondary schoolTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 213
Figure A5
(continued)
E. Education: Secondary school
F. Education: High school or more
Note: Data constructed using ENEU data. Shades represent crises periods.214 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A6
Event study: GDP and GDP per capita
A. GDP
B. GDP per capita
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 215
Figure A7
Event study: Employment/Population by age group
A. Males 15-24
B. Males 25-50216 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A7
(continued)
C. Males 50 and over




F. Females 50 and over
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.218 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A8
Event study: Employment/Population by education group
A. Males less than secondary school
B. Males secondary schoolTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 219
Figure A8
(continued)
C. Males high school or more
D. Females less than secondary school220 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A8
(continued)
E. Females secondary school
F. Females high school or more
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 221
Figure A9
Event study: Unemployment rate by age group
A. Males 15-24
B. Males 25-50222 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A9
(continued)
C. Males 50 and over




F. Females 50 and over
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.224 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A10
Event study: Unemployment rate by education group
A. Males less than secondary school
B. Males secondary schoolTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 225
Figure A10
(continued)
C. Males high school or more
D. Females less than secondary school226 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A10
(continued)
E. Females secondary school
F. Females high school or more
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 227
Figure A11
Event study: Share in formal sector by age group
A. Males 15-24
B. Males 25-50228 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A11
(continued)
C. Males 50 and over




F. Females 50 and over
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.230 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A12
Event study: Share in formal sector by education group
A. Males less than secondary school
B. Males secondary schoolTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 231
Figure A12
(continued)
C. Males high school or more
D. Females less than secondary school232 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A12
(continued)
E. Females secondary school
F. Females high school or more
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 233
Figure A13
Event study: Formal employment and relative wages
A. Formal employment: Males 25-50
B. Formal employment: Males secondary school234 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A13
(continued)
C. Formal employment: Females secondary school
D. Relative wage F/I: Males 25-50THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 235
Figure A13
(continued)
E. Relative wage F/I: Males secondary school
F. Relative wage F/I: Females secondary school
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable on that
quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient ϕk−ϕ−1 using
regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.236 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A14
Simulation of the model
A. Formal sector wages
B. Informal sector wagesTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 237
Figure A14
(continued)
C. Formal sector employment
Note: Simulations of equation (6). IS refers to Informal Labor Supply elasticity,
ID to Informal Labor Demand elasticity, and FS to Formal Labor Supply elasticity.
Figure A15
Simulation of the model including wage subsidies
A. Formal sector wages238 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure A15
(continued)
B. Informal sector wages
C. Formal sector employment
Note: Simulations of equation (6). Labor supply elasticity in the formal sector
is equal to 0.75, and in the informal sector is equal to 0. Labor demand elasticity inTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 239
the informal sector is set to 1. Shock of -9 percent only applies to formal sector, the
informal sector still gets a 10 percent negative shock. The reason for this is that a
decrease in the tax rate of ﬁrms only applies to formal sector ﬁrms. I am assuming
that a decrease of 1 percent in the tax rate of ﬁrms is the same as a 1 percent positive
shock to ﬁrms.
Table A1
Elasticities of outcomes with respect to GDP
Group Crisis Emp/Pop Unemp % Employment Relative
rate formal formal wage
Males 1995 0.342 -5.404 1.468 1.590 -0.016
15-24 2008 1.644 -4.660 0.934 1.945 -0.515
Males 1995 0.176 -5.305 0.549 0.429 -0.366
25-50 2008 0.383 -7.814 0.738 0.499 -0.307
Males less 1995 0.455 -8.192 1.453 1.607 -0.409
than secon- 2008 1.431 -7.693 0.677 1.700 0.085
dary school
Female less 1995 -0.510 -5.379 1.440 0.728 -0.868
than secon- 2008 0.778 -4.387 1.485 1.980 0.717
dary school
Males 1995 0.154 -5.178 0.793 0.626 -0.982
secondary 2008 0.583 -5.497 1.015 0.297 -0.511
school
Females 1995 -0.762 -1.686 1.094 0.342 -0.675
secondary 2008 0.788 -2.940 0.854 0.514 -0.025
school
Males 1995 -0.033 -3.419 0.775 0.357 -0.302
high school 2008 0.342 -5.101 0.482 -0.714 -0.466
or more
Females 1995 -0.047 -5.153 1.163 0.655 -0.051
high school 2008 0.591 -1.285 -0.157 -2.081 1.105
or more
Note: Elasticities are calculated with respect to event 2 for each crisis.240 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Appendix B
Derivation of the Model























and deﬁning dAF = θF,d A I = θI,d s= sF, and the elasticities of






































= θI + εF
wF∆%wF
By solving equations (8) we get the equations written in (5).
Equation (8) determines the optimum change in wages in the
formal and informal sector ∆%wF and ∆%wI, hence the change in
formal labor is obtained by substituting the changes in wages:
∆%LF = εF
wF∆%wF − εF
wI∆%wITHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 241
Figure B1
Event study: Formal employment and relative wages
A. Formal employment: Males 15-24
B. Formal employment: Males HS242 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure B1
(continued)
C. Formal employment: Females HS
D. Relative wage F/I: Males 15-24THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 243
Figure B1
(continued)
E. Relative wage F/I: Males HS
F. Relative wage F/I: Females HS
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable
on that quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient
ϕk−ϕ−1 using regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.244 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure B2
Event study: Formal and informal wages
A. Formal: Males 15-24
B. Formal: Males secondary schoolTHE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SHOCKS ON EMPLOYMENT 245
Figure B2
(continued)
C. Formal: Males high school
D. Informal: Males 15-24246 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
Figure B2
(continued)
E. Informal: Males secondary school
F. Informal: Males high school
Note: Each dot is interpreted as the mean eﬀect of the outcome variable
on that quarter with respect to period -1. Each dot is obtained from coeﬃcient
ϕk−ϕ−11 using regression (1). Each line represents a diﬀerent regression.